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9/11 Commission Report

11.18.2004

Slade Gorton, was on campus today to give a presentation on the 9/11 Commission Report. The former GOP senator was a member of the bipartisan committee. I sat in the back, taking attendance as my students rolled in for their extra credit.

First, I found Gorton's remarks remarkable in their simplicity, directness, and forthrightness. Of course, people who expected him to support their pre-drawn conclusions or opinions about 9/11 were disgruntled — as such people tend to be. But here's a rundown of Gorton's remarks:

He started by pointing out that even Richard Clarke, who Gorton described as the "most alarmist" of the pre-9/11 intelligence community, told the Commission he'd never imagined anything like 9/11 happening. Gorton argued the attacks were principally caused by a total intelligence breakdown across all departments over more than a decade. This included simply not knowing or imagining al-Qaeda could do such a thing, or even that it was capable. Intelligence services didn't communicate w/ one another, even during the 9/11 attacks. The most shocking revelation was that the Air Force wasn't notified of some of the hijackings until after the planes struck their targets. In short, there was no anticipation of the attacks (certainly none at the highest levels) & no ability to react quickly during the events themselves.

Essentially, Gorton argued, the 9/11 Commission discovered that many agencies, such as the FAA (Federal Aviation Authority), were still operating under 1970s protocols. These included instructions to pilots to cooperate w/ hijackers & take them wherever they wanted. After all, that's the pattern of plane hijackings prior to 2001. Similarly, the FBI had a list of hundreds of terrorists; the FAA was not even aware such a list existed.

Similarly, none of the intelligence reaching either Clinton or Bush ever clearly suggested direct action against al-Qaeda. Intelligence that did reach the president (Gorton stated that FBI director Louis Freeh never once met w/ Clinton) was so watered down & mushy, it couldn't be construed as a "warning" or directive to act decisively.

In contrast, Gorton argued that post-9/11 reaction was "swift" & "decisive" in areas such as Afghanistan, and in the creation of a Homeland Security office. One of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, of course, was to create a central location to share & analyze the intelligence from various government agencies, w/ the ability to give speedy information & recommendations to the president. As usual, the US government has reacted in fits & starts, rather than in a fluid cohesive policy.

The few recommendations Gorton made — since he kept pointing out that the Commission's job was to write the "history" of the attack, not to nitpick policies — were three:

1. Attack terrorists & terrorist sanctuaries
   
2. Engage in a "war of ideas" to isolate terrorists & promote peaceful, internal changes towards democracy & liberal freedoms in the Muslim world.
   
3. Prepare for & better anticipate future attacks on the US, while still protecting our civil liberties.

The questions were, for the mast part, uninteresting (in my opinion). There were a few good information-seeking questions about specific elements of the 9/11 Report. And then the questions that tried to push Gorton into going beyond the scope of the Report, which he strongly resisted. But, all in all, a pretty interesting (if not spectacular) presentation.

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ADDENDUM: The most interesting part of Gorton's presentation came when he stopped between questions, to point out four heroes of 9/11, though he didn't name them by name. The first was an air traffic controller who, rather than follow protocol, directly called an Air Force base (using the phonebook) which led to the only two fighters scrambled over New York. The second was a mid-level FAA worker who, on his own authority, ordered all other flights over the US to immediately land. The third, an INS agent who made a "seat of the pants" judgment about the lone terrorist arrested before he could carry out the attack. Finally, a United Airways controller who, again her own authority, personally called each United flight in the air to tell them to lock their cabin doors & resist any hijackings. Essentially, the only things that went "right" that day were individual people who made individual judgments.

Posted by Miguel at 09:23 PM

Comments

Posted by: tom at November 18, 2004 11:52 PM

Posted by: Nenad at November 20, 2004 02:10 AM