Bolivia's Allende moment?

01.07.2005

I'm trying to get a handle on what's going on in Bolivia the last 3 weeks. Protests, more protests, antagonistic political discourse — from all sides. All the while, I'm re-reading Arturo Valenzuela's The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (for the graduate seminar I'm sitting in on). The parallels are, well, scary.

Yes, they're totally different cases. Allende was, after all, elected. But by 1973, he lacked the support of any political party — he was isolated from a deeply divided parliament. And mass mobilizations in the streets (from all sides) made many elites nervous. The kicker, of course, is that a highly disciplined, professional military, w/ limited history of political involvement, decided, in a short amount of time, to take matters into its own hands.

Valenzuela, btw, places much of the blame for Chile's democratic breakdown on the inability of centrists to hold their ground against the centrifugal forces that continued to further polarize the political system. Influenced, of course, by studies of the collapse of Germany's Weimar Republic.

The parallels to Bolivia, though not entirely similar, are there. Mesa's a president w/ no political party. He's facing antagonistic forces that seem to no longer want dialogue, but only public manifestaciones as a show of political force. But Bolivia has one dynamic not present in Chile's scenario that makes it even worse. Added to — and reinforcing — the political cleavages are the regional antagonisms that could mean not only the end of Bolivian democracy, but Bolivia itself.

How much longer can Mesa hold out? How much longer are the military willing to sit by? How much longer are the financial elites (especially in Santa Cruz & Tarija) willing to wait for the kind of stability they need to go forward w/ industrial & commercial development?

I remember back in Bolivia a few months ago, watching manifestaciones w/ banners & excited chants of "Ahora sí! Guerra civil!". The calls for a "revolutionary" civil war — a war the military will certainly win — may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

None of this is inevitable, of course. I'm no fatalist. And I'm certainly being rather pessimistic. But what irritates me most is the failure of many people I encountered in Bolivia to face the possible consequences that loomed on the horizon. Taking a non-coup for granted — even taking non-secession for granted — means people take no safeguards to prevent catastrophe.

Posted by Miguel at 01:46 PM

Comments

Definitely the “centrists” hold the key to the country. I tend to think of them as those people who just want to live and work in peace, without worrying about strikes, blockades, or other disruptions. They are also tired of the inefficiency and corruption that plagues most public services.

However, those in the center have no real voice. They do not participate in marches because they need to work. Who will pay them to march?

Look at El Alto, where Paredes won by a large margin. I would guess that those who participated in the uprising October 2003 support de la Cruz and supported boycotting the Referendum. But most Alteños voted for Paredes, who was supported by Tuto Quiroga. Paredes is by no means a far left-winger and makes you wonder whether there are more "centrists" in El Alto that it led to believe.

Posted by: eduardo at January 7, 2005 03:54 PM