Ciao!

Depends on the type of group that U is. Is it an internationally accepted government? Is it a terrorist organization? Is it a book club? Each of these have different qualities and different outcomes for the group that seeks escape/revolution.

Love,
Micah

Well, the way collective action problems are considered, the kind of group really doesn't matter. These are just rational choice based excercises. Under what incentive/punishment structure do the different actors decide to engage in collective action.

Think "prisoner's dilemma" (the first collective action game problem).

Okay, it seems to me that the justification to separate is unnecessary. Initially I thought, "If subsets of U are in breach of contract--that contract being the functionality and universality of G--then, if they can prove it, they may revolt." However, now that I think about it, they do not need to even present a case. Here's why: Suppose that xyz have a particular religious affiliation and that part of that affiliation mandates the subjugation of jkl...in that case, jkl needs not make any appeal to xyz or the larger U in their desire to expat. All they need to do is break off.

Although, if jkl still wants the services that U offers (ie: military protection, welfare, whatever), then they will have to find some other means to get G up and running again.

Love,
Micah

I would agree. Self-determination and the rights of autonomous individuals take precedence. But can xyz & jkl come together to "solve" their collective action problem? As you say, how can they get G up & running again?

In your example, it seems that they can't. But let's say that xyz & jkl decide that xyz will govern their own affairs, and jkl will govern their own affairs, but will work together on items 123 (but no others). Could it work?

Collective action problems are part of game theory, which works on the idea of cost/rewards. In prisoner's dilemma, you have two people accused of a crime, you hope to break at least one (to confess). So you split them up, and you tell each that they'll get X year in prison if they cooperate, but Y years if they don't (but their partner does). There is a chance that both get 0 years (if neither confesses). How big a difference do X & Y have to be to get them to confess?

There's no specific solution, the idea's just that when actors are confronted w/ a radical different set of payoffs (consequences for some choice), they tend to maximize their utility (they want the least ammount of years behind bars).

Who decides which subgroups belong in U?

"Assume you recognize the right of individuals to leave their sub/group — even to abandon the territory (B) occupied by the sub/group."

Every one has the right to abandon territory, i.e. move to C, D, E, but can individuals claim part of B as their own?

Ugh, this abstract thinking gives me a headache.

Eduardo:

Imagine that at some point in time, some group of individuals decided all individuals living in territory F belong to U.

Also, does the abstract principle that any individual ai can leave U imply that a decision by subgroup a can give them the right to leave? What if subgroup a has territorial claims on Fa?

Um...I feel like I am being teased by people who have already taken Logic. Harumph.

Can't we use words instead of algebra?

Love,
Micah