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Prefecture elections?

09.01.2005

Technorati tags: Bolivia

I'm in DC interviewing for political science posts, so it's great coincidence that my editorial on prefecture elections ran in Tiempo Politico today. Below is the original (English) version.

We need to take a careful look at the prefecture elections. While the impulse to have popularly elected prefects is in principle a democratic one, there are at least two practical political issues that need consideration. In a rush to grant popularly elected prefects that are more in touch with their regional constituents, we may inadvertently create obstacles to the very goals we pursue.

First, if prefects are elected by simple plurality, then the post will be a truly winner-take-all office. Unlike the posts of mayor or president, there is no real departmental assembly or legislature. This means there would be few credible checks on prefectural power, increasing the danger of clientelism and abuse of power by any single individual or party. This danger is as true whether the winning candidate is a self-proclaimed representative of the bases populares or a friend to capitalist interests. The temptation for any person to abuse power, to act like a caudillo is too strong.

Second, the problem of a winner-take-all candidate is made worse by the reality of multiparty, multicandidate contests. It is unlikely that, in a multiparty contest, any prefect candidate will win a strict majority (50%+1) of the votes. If uninominal elections are any indication, a prefect candidate could win a plurality with as low as twenty percent of the vote. If so, the remaining voters – who would comprise a majority of the electorate – could be left entirely unrepresented by their new prefect. After a fiercely contested election, would the new prefect, with few checks on his power, feel required to represent those voters who did not vote for him?

This does not mean that prefectural elections should be abandoned. On the contrary, the desire to give Bolivian regions a sense a greater sense of political autonomy coincides with the broader impulse to deepen the Bolivia’s democracy, as were the reforms that created uninominal deputies and the Ley de Participación Popular. But careful consideration of the practical shortcomings of the results of prefecture elections, as they are currently set, is vital to protect the rights of minority citizens within each of the nine departments.

One solution could be to hold run-off elections to guarantee that no prefect is elected without support from at least half of the department’s voters. But such a solution does not adequately deal with the first problem: a single person and his party would wield ultimate authority for an entire department’s resources.

Baring the creation of an elected departmental assembly or legislature to check a prefect’s executive powers, another possible solution could include splitting the office of prefect into a multi-person office. If the prefecture was composed of a three-member body, the top three candidates could be elected to the post. Even if the plurality winner were named the official prefect, the law could be modified to require two of three co-prefects to agree on any decision.

The elections are still three months away; there is plenty of time to make any modifications to the process for electing prefects. There is no reason to backtrack on the democratic impulse to allow department’s to elect their own prefects. But we must ensure that the desire for greater political autonomy and more direct representation is also accompanied by institutional mechanisms to protect the democratic rights of all citizens.

Posted by Miguel at 01:12 AM

Comments

Posted by: Miguel (MABB) at September 1, 2005 03:26 PM

Posted by: sam at September 1, 2005 09:02 PM

Posted by: j.scott barnard at September 7, 2005 11:32 AM

Posted by: beverly at September 9, 2005 10:29 PM