Ciao!

I think the election also was very significant because it may mark the end of several prominent politicians. I doubt Jaime Paz Zamora ever runs again, although he will have some minor influence after his son's congressional victory.

There are a lot of people here saying that it would be unlikely that Tuto Quiroga will run again. Many also say that Samuel Doria Medina stands a very good chance as emerging as the opposition candidate during the next elections. He rarely criticized any of the top 2 candidates and was very clear in his desire to be the alternative candidate. I also think MNR lives to fight another day. Even though many did not take Nagatani very seriously, they admired him for standing in there.

Hi Miguel,

I normally enjoy your analysis quite a bit, but I think you've slightly missed the boat on this one.

I think it's a mistake to approach Evo's ideological significance solely from the perspective of to what degree he's a socialist - this seems to be what you've done here. And to then reduce it to a matter of a change in the party system seems really reductive.

I don't want to embark on a long analysis here. But I will just list a couple things that stand out to me:
1) His potential for drawing in segments of the population disaffected with national politics could be tremendous;
2) His relatively large support among Crucenos seems to belie the image of a unified secessionist-leaning Santa Cruz;
3) His clear warrant for having a political mandate of some sort seems unprecedented to me in at least recent Bolivian politics;
4) Having an indigenous person as President could clearly help to change attitudes towards race; and 5) He will likely contribute to a region-wide center-left platform that, if successful, could become more viable outside its region.

Anyhow, I know that your post hardly contained all of your thoughts on the matter. I guess my approach to the kind of issue you've raised here is to think about what kinds of social forces, if you will, are leading the way in terms of the re-organization of the political system. Some of the points I made above were in an effort to gesture towards what these larger changes might be.

Thanks for providing such great analyses of Bolivian politics, etc. - it's much appreciated on my part. Happy holidays, Benjamin

Benjamin:

You're right, and my post here didn't include all my thoughts on Evo. It's true that I'm not a big Evo fan. I think he's not well prepared to lead a state, let alone one w/ as many problems as Bolivia. I also don't think nationalizing industries or antagonizing much-needed investors will help, rather than make things worse.

But my point above was that people who think Evo is another "leftist" dictator like Castro or Chavez are exagerating. Evo has the potential to become, like Lula, someone who helps the country deal w/ some crucial socioeconomic issues. Including some of the ones you raised. My point was merely that Evo is *NOT* like Chavez or Castro, and that worries about that are overstated. Likewise, dreams of him being as powerful as Castro or Chavez by people who genuinely whish he will be, are also overstated.

I pretty much agree w/ Shugart's analysis (over at Fruits & Votes). I think the change in party system is monumental, and I do think his electoral mandate is important. I just think that his policies won't be much different than previous policies, which also did many things to improve the conditions of indigenous people (look at the 1993-97 Participacion Popular reforms!) or improve socioeconomic. My point was merely that, as a governmental administration, Evo won't be entirely revolutionary in terms of policies. Just look at how his recent statements on coca just continue the previous coca policies (erradicate coca beyond a minimum accepted quantity that should be enough for domestic traditional consumption).

Yes, I definitely agree with your main point - his policies are certainly not revolutionary (though they could be made so if his base were to force him to radicalize).

I think that as a rule "we" (Bolivian observers) have had a tendency of underestimating Evo Morales. I remember us saying that he had little chance to get elected president. We didn't even entertain the possibility of him getting the 50 + 1 vote.

However, there is one thing we can say about Morales. Since we haven't seen him govern yet, we can only say that he has the potential to follow different paths. One of them would be to follow in the steps of Chavez (again, potentially). We know very well Chavez did not build his government from one day to the other, but he did it gradually and systematically. So, I think considering the possibility of Morales following Chavez's steps is not too out of this world.

As far as socialism, I don't think we can deny the fact that Morales and MAS have some socialist ideology. He might be populist, nationalist or as you call him, syndicalist, but there is an element of socialism in the ideology.

Aslo, if Morales does not turn out to be the revolutionary he painted himself to be, the people who put him up there will make him become one. Let's not forget that policy, at this point in time, in Bolivia is not made in the presidency or even in Congress, but to a greater extent on the streets. There are already indications that at least the agitators in El Alto will not wait more than 3 months to start demanding attention.

Those are my two cents.

Merry Christmas!

I agree w/ MABB, that perhaps we've understimated Evo. But I'm not sure where his votes came from, whether they were:

A) support for Evo's policies
B) rejection of previous policies
C) resignation to give Evo a chance to prevent him from destabilizing the next govt

I suspect that the bulk of his support came from B+C, more than from A. At least, if we believe the polls that suggested he was not a likey "second choice" candidate after the others. Also, his high voter support came from undecideds, so we don't know why they broke for him at the last minute.

But I do think that Evo had little chance of becoming like Chavez. Mainly, because Chavez was a military man, w/ ties to the military throughout his career. Evo has antagonized the military throughout his career. He can't ride roughshod over the constitution w/o military support. And I just don't see him getting it. Also, I think there are more checks & balances on Evo than there were in the early days of Chavez. Is it possible? Sure. But I suspect he'll more likely try to make himself into a Lula. After all, he'll soon find that Bolivia & Venezuela have competing energy interests.

Also, I'm not sure if the streets can turn Evo out. But that's more likely than Evo turning dictator. IMHO.

Hi Miguel,

Sorry I'm a bit late for the party on this. I'm afraid I have a rather contrarian view too.

"Evo has the potential to become, like Lula, someone who helps the country deal w/ some crucial socioeconomic issues."

I'm afraid I couldn't disagree with you more here. Not because of who Evo Morales is, but because of where his country is.

Especially in terms of the demography. Brazil and Argentina are arriving - like Turkey - at the sweet demographic moment. Bolivia - like Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador - are still in a heavily child dependent stage.

I have posted about this a little a A Fistful of Euros:

http://fistfulofeuros.net/archives/002206.php

Maybe some say that this is a little simplistic, but I would suggest that it is a little less simplistic than simply pardoning debta nd crossing your fingers, or agruing that the whole issue is one of corruption, to mention two of the most fashionable theories about why the LDCs are stuck in a development trap.

I think you need something like Niklas Luhmann's concept of 'embedding' and sudenly the idea is not as simplistic as it seems.

Brazil and Argentina are now busy paying back the money they owe to the IMF. In Bolivia if I were you I'd be keeping a sharp eye out on where the military might be going.

"Yes, I definitely agree with your main point - his policies are certainly not revolutionary (though they could be made so if his base were to force him to radicalize)."

I think Benjamin is in the right ballpark here. This is what could happen. Remember the Allende tragedy in Chile. He was hardly a madman revolutionary either.

Edward:

I think I agree, that Evo has a very slim chance of actually becoming like Lula, for the same reasons (small population, lower industrial development, less diversified economy, etc). But my point was merely that he has an even slimmer chance (or none at all, really) of becoming like Chavez.

I also agree w/ the idea of debt forgiveness. By forgiving the debt of the countries least able to pay back debt (often, because they've mismanaged their economies), we punish countries (like India) that have been able to reign in their economies & take responsibility for their debt burden. I agree w/ the idea of forgiving debt of countries *most* able to pay back their debt, as a way to encourage other countries to begin taking greater responsibility for their economic management. Otherwise, we forgive debt now, but then have to either loan or give money to those same countries soon after.

But the main point was simply that Evo has almost no chanec of becoming a dictator. Could he open up the country to a Pinochet-style right wing reaction? Perhaps. But I think that's less likely because, unlike 1973 Chile, the country also now has directly elected prefects & municipal governments (Chile was then still centralized), as well as greater expectations of regional & local autonomy.

The bottom line is just that, for all his bluster & rhetoric, Evo doesn't have the same resources Chavez did in 1998. Nor is he likely to gain them (most importantly: ties to sympathetic ranking military officers). The recent concessionary rhetoric (towards the middle class, towards the US, towards international investors) suggests he knows this, too.

Miguel,

Thanks for the clarification. It seems we are not very far apart, especially since I know next to nothing about the actual details of what is happening in Bolivia. This is why reading you, or Eduardo, or the other Miguel (MABB) is interesting.

I do however, get a different perspective from people in the US, since I get the Spanish lanugauge versions of things (this was IMHO very important during the Argentina crisis, with Cavallo saying one thing in English and another in Spanish).

I also get the debate here in Spain, and obviously Zapatero's view is different from the Bush one. Repsol YPF does seem to be a major actor in all this.

On the population issue, it isn't the size that is important - look at the Scandinavian countries for example - but the age structure.

This is important in economic terms - since if you look at life cycle theory age structures affect saving and investment behaviour. But I would argue that it is also important for political behaviour.

European societies were pretty active and reforming in the sixties and seventies when they were dominated by much younger age groups, now the dominant groups are over 50, and there is tremendous resistance to reform.

Really I need to work out the political dimension of all this. I got interested in the problem as an economist working on the economic dynamics of elderly societies like Germany and Japan. I now realise that this work also has implication for what you could call the demographic outliers - the 18 'countries identified in the 2005 United Nations Human Development Report as going backwards, as well as the 'slow developers' in which group I would put Bolivia.

The key test for Morales will, IMHO, be globalisation. If he gets embroiled with Chavez and Maradona don't look for anything good to happen, if he were to pull Bolivia into the new globalisation pragmatist group - Lula, Kirchner, Bachelet - then of course things would be much better, but somehow the demographic constraints make me think this unlikely.

I think I will now be following Bolivia like a hawk as I see it as an interesting test case for my general hypothesis, as is Italy at the other end of the spectrum. If I am even halfway right, you should get a loud bang out of Italy at some point as the fiscal dynamic of an ageing population causes the government debt problem to explode.

Also, Bolivia now has something of a semi-federal system w/ elected prefects (governors), and 5 of 9 are Morales opponents. So there are plenty of checks & balances.

Opposes Evo:
Beni - ERNESTO SUAREZ SATTORI (PODEMOS)
La Paz - Jose Luis Paredes(PODEMOS)
Pando - LEOPOLDO FERNANDEZ FERREIRA (PODEMOS)

Supports Evo:
Chuquisaca - DAVID SANCHEZ HEREDIA (MAS)
Oruro - Alberto Luis Aguilar (MAS)
Potosí - MARIO VIRREIRA IPORRE (MAS)

What about these?
Cochabamba - MANFRED REYES VILLA (AUC)
Santa Cruz - RUBEN DARIO COSTAS AGUILERA (APB)
Tarija - Mario Adel Cossio (ERCC)

Fredrik:

Manfred Reyes Villa was the founder of NFR (New Republican Force), a right-populist party that dominated the urban Cochabamba political machine. He's been a long-standing Evo opponent on Evo's own "home turf" since the mid-90s. I don't expect a reconcilliation.

Ruben Costas is the leader of the Comite Civico of Santa Cruz, a sort of local civic group umbrella that (according to some is dominated by rich/conservative groups) supports regional autonomy. The Comite Civico has been highly critical of Evo & the movements that toppled Goni (Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada), even threatening de facto secession at points. While Evo has made overtures to this group (and discovered that its membership includes workers movements, not just rich elites), I don't expect them to burry the hatchet right away. The meeting was amicable, but only because Evo had to agree to push forward w/ greater regional autonomy.

Mario Cossio is a membrer of MNR (Goni's party), and former House of Deputies whip for MNR. He also represents both the new forces of the MNR as well as a civic movement in Tarija that (like the Santa Cruz movement) demands greater regional autonomy & the kind of economic policies pursued by Goni's administration (they, like the Santa Cruz Comite Civico) strongly oppose the nationalization of hydrocarbons.

While the other PODEMOS prefects will likely oppose Evo on various issues, these three "independent" prefects will cause the most trouble. NFR was known for corruption & machine politics; I expect Manfred will do what he can to take advantage of his prefecture in a large department, causing headaches for Evo, who'll want to give resources to the region, but will have to let Manfred control their distribution.

On the other hand, both the Santa Cruz & Tarija prefectures will be demanding greater regional political & economic autonomy. What this will mean is that the regions w/ the greatest economic power (especially hydrocarbons) will demand that management of & proficts from these resources stay in regiona hands. This'll make any centralized hydrocarbons policy difficult, and moreso any economic redistributive policies to the poorest departments (Oruro & Potosi) if money from the richest departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni) are unavailable.

Thanks Miguel for an great answer!

This implies that six of nine prefectures will oppose Evo. However there might be an MAS majority in som of these prefecure cameras (parliament)? And what about Peredes of La Paz his Plan Progreso is more centre-left or even left and PODEMOS is more centre-right, might he cooperate with Evo?

And what about NFR. As I have understad it was part of the Banzer government but left it. It cast blanc ballots in the election between Goni and Evo in the parliament, it then supported the Goni government and then left it... is this correct?

So six of nine prefectures opposes Evo then?

But what about Peredes. His Plan Progresso is more left of centre and PODEMOS is more right, might he cooperate with Evo. And does the prefectures have parliaments and what which party has a majority in the La Paz prefecture?

About NFR. I have understood that i was part of the Banzer government but left it. It cast blac votes (why did they?) in the election between Evo and Goni in parliament and then supported the Goni government and finnaly opposed it, is this correct?

Fredrik:

First, there are no regional parliaments or legislatures. There are only prefects. It's a one man post. Previously, the president appointed the prefect directly (no popular election). But the demands for autonomy led to direct popular election of prefects for the first time ever in 2005 (in my opinion, a dangerous idea).

Yes, NFR was part of the Banzer government, it actually campaigned together in an ADN-NFR-PDC alliance in 1997. It did cast blank ballots in 2002 during the parliamentary election for president (refused to support either Goni or Evo), and only joined the coalition when Goni desperately needed a larger coalition in the face of unrest in September-October 2003. But NFR demanded too much (cabinet posts, bureaucratic areas of influence, etc) and gave too little. It also became the first party to leave Goni in October 2003.

As for Peredes, he *might* have some agreement w/ Evo on things (which is why I think only FIVE prefectures will actually "oppose" Evo). But Peredes isnt' really all that radical. He could find common ground w/ Evo, but he could also oppose more radical moves. Also, Peredes has been a political figure longer, and is also very popular in El Alto, the city that almost single handedly toppled two presidents in two years (Goni & Mesa). Evo will need to court Peredes (and other El Alto leaders) to have smooth sailing.

I think it might be a little more difficult for Manfred to openly oppose the central government. A large portion of the municipal governments in Cochabamba are ran by MAS mayors or MAS-friendly mayors (i.e. Chaly Terceros' CIU citizens' group openly supported MAS, including MAS flags with the CIU's logo of a shamrock). I think there will be more pressure from the municipalities to go along with MAS plans.

Also, in Tarija I wonder of Cossio is still part of MNR. There has been talk that MNR will support MAS to gain control of the senate.

Eduardo:

I hadn't thought about the relationship between prefects & alcaldes (mayors) before. Especially since they're now both independently elected from each other, and from the national government. It'll certainly be interesting. But I'm not sure what kind of institutional levers alcaldes have against prefects. I'd actually expect it to be the other way around (that prefects have resources to use against alcaldes).

As for MNR supporting MAS to gain control of the senate. I think it's an interesting proposition. It would mostly benefit MNR, rather than MAS, since that single seat will be so important, that MAS legislation in the senate will have to go through a virtual "veto point". If such an alliance becomes a reality, I'm curious to see what kind of benefits MNR gets, and what it costs MAS.