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My thoughts on Evo (part 2)

01.10.2006

Technorati tag: Bolivia

This is the second installment of thoughts on what I think his victory & upcoming presidency might mean.

W/ all the attention on Evo's upcoming presidency, few international observers have pointed out the internal difficulties his government is likely to have. Most of the focus has been on Evo's international relations, and what policies his government may or may not pursue. Will he nationalize the country's oil & natural gas reserves? Will he end the eradication of coca crops in the Chapare? Questions such as these are frequently used to discuss the upcoming presidency. But they fall short. In a representative democracy (if it's functioning properly), no president has unlimited power.

First, Evo won a clear mandate as the first presidential candidate to win an absolute majority of votes in more than twenty years of democracy. But while he won a simple majority in the lower chamber (the House of Deputies), his party didn't win a majority in the upper chamber (the Senate). This is important, not only because it forces Evo to secure the support of the two senators from UN & the MNR. But also because many reforms will require a two-thirds supermajority, which requires support from opposition parties. To secure support form opposition parties, Evo's government must learn to compromise, backing away from some of his campaign's more radical promises.

Second, the first ever direct election of regional prefects means the country is now a de facto federal republic (even if the constitution calls it a "unitary republic"). Most of the nine prefects are likely to clash w/ Evo's government, some (like Santa Cruz & Tarija) on a regular basis. As the organs responsible for implementing policy in the country's nine departments, the prefects will have a great deal of leverage. And, unlike in previous governments, these enjoy popular, electoral legitimacy. Control over funds appropriated to departmental development funds (the CORDES) also gives prefects a great deal of autonomy & latitude.

Third, in addition to elected prefects, Bolivia has now also enjoyed a decade of locally elected municipal governments. Unlike the prefectures, these governments' funds are specifically mandated by law. Twenty percent of the national budget is partitioned based on per capita basis, distributed to the 327 municipal governments. This gives municipal governments an autonomous set of resources to pursue their own local policies.

The real dilemma for any incoming government, however, is the regionalism issue. Too many outside observers have focused on the issue of oil & natural gas reserves. There is the assumption that "the Bolivian people" voted for Evo, therefore rejecting the status quo & advocating nationalization. But "the Bolivian people" is not a singular, monolithic entity. Sure, 54% of the population voted for Evo. But this means that 46% of the population didn't.

It's especially important to note that Evo's ticket fared worst in the regions w/ proven oil & natural gas reserves. This is important. A year ago, the departments of Santa Cruz & Tarija spearheaded calls for increased regional autonomy — including autonomy over decisions made about natural resources. During the October 2003 guerra del gas protests, mass counter-protests in Santa Cruz & Tarija marched in defense of exporting the region's hydrocarbons. At some extreme moments, the threat of secession was raised. Now, I'm not suggesting that secession is the most likely outcome to any confrontation between the hydrocarbons-rich lowland regions & the central government. But it's important to keep in mind that secession is possible.

Evo might want to nationalize the country's hydrocarbons, but he'll face strong resistance from politicians from the lowlands. On the other hand, if he lets the lowlands keep a greater share of oil & natural gas revenues w/in the regions that produce them (as a growing movement from the lowlands demands), he loses the economic resources desperately needed in the country's poorer Andean regions (which don't have lucrative natural resources), such as Potosí & Oruro. Walking that tight balance will be very difficult for any Bolivian government. It spelled the doom for Mesa's administration.

In the end, Evo will have to cross an important hurdle: turning from opposition leader to international statesman (the topic of my next installment).

Posted by Miguel at 06:28 PM

Comments

Posted by: Logan Foster at January 11, 2006 03:04 PM

Posted by: Patrick at January 12, 2006 10:38 AM

Posted by: mcentellas at January 12, 2006 11:03 AM