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The Decline of the MNR?

02.20.2006

Technorati tags: Bolivia politics MNR

[NOTE:The following few paras were written for a brief section of my dissertation where I discuss the recent 2005 elections. I'm satisfied enough w/ them as a coherent, individual argument to post it here. But it's not meant as anything other than a preliminary draft of a small section of a much larger work.]

The decline of the MNR (the political party with the longest historical trajectory in Bolivian politics) in the 2005 election should also be taken in context. While the party’s fourth place finish (6.47%) was its worst ever, it did remarkably well when compared to the virtual disintegration of ADN in the 2002 election (3.40%). After Sánchez de Loza’s overthrow in October 2003, public sentiment against the MNR (particularly in La Paz and Cochabamba) was extremely high. In the two years leading up to the December 2005 election, the party was highly divided over issues of leadership, policy platform, and future strategy.

The party’s nomination of Michiaki Nagatani, after a contentious party congress in Santa Cruz, was a surprise. The little-known son of Japanese immigrants had impressed many with his austere campaign in the 2004 Santa Cruz municipal elections, but his citizen’s group (MACA) had won only 3.86% of the city’s vote [1]. Many had expected a more experienced party figure to run for president; earlier rumors had even hinted at recognized names like Juan Carlos Durán (the party’s 1997 presidential candidate), Percy Fernández (former mayor of Santa Cruz), or Moira Paz (senator from Tarija and daughter of MNR founder, Víctor Paz Estenssoro), who hoped simultaneously to distance themselves from Sánchez de Lozada while campaigning on their previous public office records. Almost immediately after Nagatani’s nomination was announced, party leaders (especially Durán and Moira Paz) went on the offensive, denouncing Nagatani’s nomination as manipulated by partisans loyal to Sánchez de Lozada. The MNR thus entered the 2005 election after a controversial nomination that bitterly divided many party leaders (members had come to blows during the nomination process) and with a candidate with little name recognition but accused of simply being creature of Sánchez de Lozada.

Nevertheless, Nagatani ran a steady campaign that slowly gained momentum [2]. A somewhat-reconciled party machine and an electoral list that included many established MNR figures and incumbents, such as his vice presidential candidate, Guillermo Bedregal, boosted Nagatani’s presidential campaign [3]. While some former MNR candidates became candidates for other lists, many remained loyal and ran under the party’s banner. More importantly, despite placing a distant fourth, the party retained its position as an important party in at least four lowland departments – the same region where it had consistently done well since 1985 – even winning an impressive 30.12% in Beni. Where Nagatani and the MNR did poorly was in Andean departments, especially La Paz and Cochabamba, where the MNR’s fortunes had steadily declined since the 1990s.

A brief comparison with the 1997 and 2002 elections is instructive. The MNR’s 1997 presidential campaign was also plagued by problems, after its original candidate (René Blattmann) withdrew in order to run with his own electoral list and was replaced by Durán. The campaign was hurried and disorganized, producing the party’s worst showing to that time (18.59%). The 2002 Sánchez de Lozada campaign saw the party recover, but only slightly. More importantly, the party only picked up a few percentage points in the departments of La Paz (+3.16%), Cochabamba (+1.42%), and Oruro (+1.87%). Thus, when the MNR recovered almost four points nationally between 1997 and 2002, its recovery was markedly smaller in the Andean departments. Similarly, the party’s substantial national decline between 2002 and 2005 was greater in the same Andean departments, and smaller in lowland departments.

The MNR’s respectable showing in the 2005 electoral contest suggests the party may yet play an important role in regional and national politics for some time to come. More importantly, the party has demonstrated a significant level of institutionalization. Unlike ADN, the party has survived both the death of its founders and a deep crisis of legitimacy following Sánchez de Lozada’s deeply troubled and controversial second presidency. Its single seat in the Senate also gives the MNR a significant role, as it allows the party to play a balancing role between MAS and PODEMOS, especially since a pro-MAS majority requires cooperation from both the MNR and UN (which also has a single seat). This puts Morales in the uncomfortable position of needing the support of the political party that perhaps best epitomizes the pre-2003 status quo. Even its seven seats in the House of Deputies give it a sizeable presence. Finally, although the party only officially campaigned for five prefectures (it placed a strong second in Beni and Santa Cruz), the campaign for the prefecture of Tarija by Mario Cossío gave the party a stronghold in one prefecture [4]. Clearly, the MNR no longer has the kind of broad national support it enjoyed in the 1980s and 1990s. But even at its lowest historical point, the party continues to have political relevance.

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[1] Because the 2004 constitutional amendments loosened the requirements for candidates to run for municipal elections (candidates could now run without the support of a “political party” but with the support of a “citizen’s group” or “indigenous community” instead), Nagatani was able to campaign independently of the “official” MNR candidate (Maria Desiree Bravo, a uninominal deputy from Santa Cruz). Other established MNR members also campaigned independently, such as Roxana Sandoval (MNR uninominal deputy from Santa Cruz) nominated by the citizen’s group MCPP.

[2] Before Nagatani’s candidacy was announced on 21 August 2005, his name was not included in any polls. A pre-electoral poll by Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado gave Nagatani only 2% nationwide in early September. Between the first week of October and the first week of December, a series of four Ipsos-Captura polls gave Nagatani between 4.1% (the first poll) and 5.5% (the third poll).

[3] Bedregal was an established MNR elder statesman, having played a key role in the party since 1952. In the post democratization period, he was elected deputy from La Paz in 1985, 1989, 1993, and plurinominal deputy in 1997; Bedregal also served briefly as Planning Minister (before he was replaced by Sánchez de Lozada) and later as Foreign Minister in the 1985-1989 Paz Estenssoro administration.

[4] Though Cossío did not officially run as an MNR candidate, the party did not present a list. Despite campaigning under the banner of the regional citizen’s group, Camino al Cambio (CC), Cossío is still identified with the MNR and frequently referred to in newspaper reports as “the MNR prefect” for Tarija.

Posted by Miguel at 06:11 PM

Comments

Posted by: Hoppeditz at March 5, 2006 09:57 AM

Posted by: mcentellas at March 5, 2006 10:39 AM