42 regions
11.02.2006Technorati tags: Bolivia politics
MABB beat me to punch on this one: The Bolivian government unveiled a proposal — for discussion at the constituent assembly (CA) — to politically subdivide the country's territory into 42 regional subunits. These units would operate below the departmental level (9 departments) & above the municipal level (327 municipalities). MABB is (w/ good reasons) skeptical of the proposal. I disagree.
Is this (probably) a ploy to weaken anti-MAS opposition in the opposition-dominated prefectures (the departmental governments)? Probably. It's certainly in line w/ other measures taken in recent weeks (such as extending MAS loyalty "tests" to the prefectures, since these are technically agents of the executive branch).
But it's not entirely a bad idea. In fact, it was an idea Iván Finot & I pushed at the 2004 decentralization conference at Mallasilla (here (unfortunately, the longer post at for the defunct Southern Exposure blog is lost).
Currently, Bolivia is subdivided into departments, provinces, and municipalities (the "indigenous territories" are treated as municipalities). Of these three subdivisions, provinces are meaningless. They have no real bureaucracy, administrative oversight, or even institutional structures. So the real subdivisions are department & municipality. But some municipalities are too small for effective governance. And some municipalities would like to band together (into mancomunidades) for projects that require the coordination of two or more municipalities. Finally, of course, municipal governments have weak connections to the prefectures & are instead administered through the central government (there used to be a Ministry of Popular Participation before Evo became president). There have also been calls by many communities in the regional periphery for autonomy from the prefectures, which are dominated by the departmental capitals.
In the end, I think it's only reasonable that many of these issues be addressed at a mid-level administrative unit between the municipality & the department. If anything, because it further disaggregates decision-making power, which is good for a Madisonian conception of liberal democracy. And it's a good compromise instead of breaking up large departments (like Santa Cruz). Of course, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. But I'm actually encouraged by this move.
Posted by Miguel at 10:40 AM
Comments
Sorry, but when I saw the graph on your Flickr side bar, I naturally looked at it more carefully, since my diss topic is decentralization in Bolivia.
Just one thing, disaggregating decision-making is generally a good idea, and one of the many goals of decentralization. One argument goes that in such a manner, decision-making is brought closer to the people. However, often too much disaggregation can result in disconnection. I fear that this move is potentially disconnecting because the communication, or shall I better say, the support the prefectures have to provide to municipalities are not going well. They are supposed to ease/coordinate the work between the central government and the local one. In Bolivia there is a big gap between theory and practice. As often is, but in this case is specially big.
One more layer of bureaucracy will result in more difficulties, I think.
Posted by: Miguel (mabb) at November 3, 2006 07:14 AM
I can see where you're coming from. And I agree that an extra layer of bureaucracy may muddle things even more. But perhaps it could actually strengthen the municipalities? Besides, I think the prefectures tend to focus their attention on the cities, not the rural municipalities. So this might help solve the local units' collective action problem. Beyond that, I know that there's been talk about breaking up the larger departments to provide autonomy for other "regions" (Chaco, Vallegrande, Tupiza, etc.). I think this is a modest compromise. Of course, what would really be more useful would be actual departmental level legislative elections. But that's too "federal" a solution for La Paz to accept, I fear.
Posted by: mcentellas at November 3, 2006 08:52 AM
Miguel: How would an American style system work? As originally intended by the framers of the Constitution, and the more centralized, federal system we have today? How would Departmental legislatures work? As I understand it, there aren't real local (municipal) elections at this time.
Posted by: Galloglass at November 4, 2006 06:22 PM
I don't know if I'd call a federal system (or just a "decentralized" system) and "American style system" necessarily. There are different forms of decentralization (e.g. Spain, Bosnia, and others). So it could go in different directions.
Thad said, I think departmental legislative bodies would help put a check on the prefects. Currently, prefectures are one-person offices. Though constitutionally an extension of the central executive (the Bolivian president), they're now elected by popular vote. But a one-person office is by definition a winnter-take-all (and here we mean *ALL*) kind of contest. Should there be a regional consultative body that can represent the balance of political forces in a department? I don't see why not. It need not be an autonomy federal government, or even a large body — perhaps a small council of 5 or 7 members, even. Just something that will make the prefectures more representative, consultative, and deliberative bureaucracies.
Also, there are municipal elections since the 1994 Popular Participation Law (LPP). In them, each municipality has a minimum of 3 council seats (the larger ones have more than a dozen). Voters cast ballots for party lists, and the seats are awarded using some variation of PR (depending on the total number of seats available). This means that most councils will include several political parties. And mayors are elected most often by the council (coalition governments), unless one list wins 50%+1 of the votes (in which case it'd also get 50%+1 of the council seats). The last municipal elections were in December 2004.
Posted by: mcentellas at November 4, 2006 06:36 PM
That is what was innovative (or shall I say special) on the Bolivian model of decentralization. There was a decentralization of the central government which reached deep into the country, namely the municipalities. These two, were the most important bodies. The prefectures, all of the sudden, lost their relevance. Their functions were reduced to support the work between the central and local governments.
A couple of years ago there was even discussion about the relevance of the prefectural level of government (or in the US, the state level of government). The question was, did Bolivia need this level? The work was passing by the prefectures directly from the central to the local governments anyways. Direct transfers, decisions being made in the local councils. It seemed as the prefectures were not needed.
However, the regional issued came up and the prefectures saved their necks. :-)
The question is still, does Bolivia need a deliverative middle level of government? Personally, I am sceptical. I think the functions prefectures have now, that is, to promote regional development (among other things), is fitting. The fact that they are no longer appointed, but elected is a plus. But, if they include a deliberative body in the equation, that for me would be closer to federalism. Which I am not opposed, but it would not be the same model.
Posted by: mabb at November 5, 2006 09:34 AM
I certainly see your point. And, yes, a federal system would be completely different than the current system. If it were a case of "integrated" federalism, rather than "N+1" federalism (there's a good article on this by Ordeshook & Shvetsova in Journal of Democracy). And, yes, this new change may be redundant and/or mostly symbolic. But at this point Bolivian politics has devolved into a series of symbolic gestures. No?
That said, I think such a move would help appease some of the regionalist tensions. First, it's a check on the power of prefects (which are as centralist as the presidency, w/in their prefectures). And it would appease those from subdepartmental regions (Tupiza, Chaco, Vallegrande, etc) who have a good point: If "regional autonomy" is desired, why do some regions get favored over others? Essentially, it's the Yugoslav question (if Bosnia can secede from Yugoslavia, why can't Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia?). This solution may close of that question by making secession less appealing/necessary. One hopes.
Posted by: mcentellas at November 5, 2006 09:49 AM
I see your point. If we assume the motivations for regionalism and its tensions are based on the premise that the prefect has too much power, then a deliberative body to (along with other things) "check and balance" that power would make sense. Those regions you mention (Chaco, etc.) would only be appeased if they have a proportional representation in the council. But if we assume interests lie elswhere, for example controlling resources, I think a deliberative power might not do much.
Frankly, I think that much of the reason for regional tensions comes from the interest on controlling the natural resources. Look at Tarija and Santa Cruz on the one side and La Paz on the other. They are essentially fighting about who gets to controll the natural gas resources. As far as I can see, there is little debate on the form of decentralization or the consequences of autonomy. What I've been able to capture is more or less who will get to make more decisions.
Posted by: mabb at November 6, 2006 09:56 AM
I think you're right; this is more a conflict over resources. But decentralization might help here, too -- if the distribution of economic resources (particularly the profits from gas) are also decentralized (or at least the decision on what to do w/ thos resources). Perhaps increasing the $$ available for municipal governments (currently 20%)?
Posted by: mcentellas at November 6, 2006 12:41 PM
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