Fulbright proposal

The following is the proposal I sent to the Institute for International Education (IIE), which won me a 2003-2004 Fulbright grant:

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to explain Bolivia's two decades of stable democracy. I pursue four explanations: 1) formal institutions; 2) legacies of the 1952 Revolution; 3) individual statesmen; and 4) patrimonial elites. I hypothesize that institutional design, especially a unique system of "parliamentarized presidentialism," has been crucial to democratic stability. I will test my hypotheses with content analysis of elite statements found in the historical record.

PROPOSAL

For most of its history Bolivia epitomized Latin American instability. It is remarkable that in 2002 Bolivian democracy celebrated twenty years. Bolivia's recent experience sharply contrasts with its Central Andean neighbors. All transitioned to democracy in the late 1970s, though by 1992 Peru had reverted to authoritarianism and Ecuador's democracy seems ever on the brink of collapse. What explains the comparative stability of Bolivian democracy? Why has it experienced neither a breakdown (as in Peru) nor chronic instability (as in Ecuador)? The survival of Bolivian democracy defies most expectations and demands an explanation.

The limited literature on Bolivia's democratization highlights a new exceptionalism. Conaghan and Malloy (1994) point out that of the three Central Andean countries, only Bolivia successfully implemented neoliberal economic reforms. In a cross−national study of Latin American democracies, Jones (1995) finds a significant relationship between his dummy variable "Bolivia" and presidential legislative majorities, which is strongly related to the survival of presidential democracy. Mayorga (1997) suggests that Bolivia's unique institutional design accounts for its democratic stability. Nevertheless, the causal relationship between formal institutions −−especially the electoral system−− and Bolivia's democratic stability has not yet been systematically tested.

My goals are to: 1) explore the relationship between political institutions and democratic stability; 2) examine the impact of specific historical−contextual factors that affect democratic stability; 3) isolate the key explanatory factors for stable democratic politics; and 4) consider the prospects for sustained democratic stability. Discovering what factors contribute to Bolivia's democratic stability may help in developing reforms to strengthen other new democracies, especially if the key factors for Bolivia's democratic stability are institutional, rather than idiosyncratic ones. The Bolivian experience is especially relevant to its Central Andean neighbors, but its lessons are applicable to other countries that face the challenge of building democracy under historically unfavorable circumstances.

Though recent literature uses the concept of democratic consolidation, I use the more modest concept of democratic stability. Requirements for democratic consolidation are often debated, but most scholars agree stability is a core necessary condition. Democracy is stable when basic procedural democratic norms are consistently followed. This means: elections go ahead as scheduled without interruptions; they are free of fraud and losers accept their outcomes; and no actors attempt to overthrow the democratic system. In simplest terms, there are no coups d'etat or other attempts to use extra−constitutional power to pursue political (or personal) ambitions.

My study adopts a historical institutionalist perspective that defines institutions as formal or informal procedures or recognized norms of political behavior. This approach contrasts with rational choice institutionalism, which assumes actors have independent, fixed interests and design institutions to maximize those interests. Historical institutionalism focuses on both formal and informal institutions and readily admits that political outcomes are influenced by historical−contextual factors. Earlier decisions have consequences on the strategies and choices available. Historical institutionalists accept rational choice's assumption that individuals act strategically, but argue that individual interests, choices, and strategies are also affected by historical context.

My study highlights four political institutions: 1) the electoral system, 2) the party system, 3) executive−legislative relations, and 4) coalition−building norms. Only the electoral system is a formal institution outlined by specific constitutional provisions. The electoral system strongly affects other institutions, especially the party system. Coalition building norms are the least formal. Though influenced by election outcomes, elite coalition building requires trust and a willingness to cooperate with one another.

I hypothesize that Bolivia's stable democracy is a product of its unique institutional system of "parliamentarized presidentialism". Specifically, I hypothesize that the key institutional variable is a fused−ballot electoral system that combines legislative and executive elections into a single party list vote. Bolivia's political system, though nominally presidential, operates essentially like a European parliamentary system; the chief executive is elected by the legislature (as stipulated in Article 90 of the Bolivian constitution) after intense coalition−building negotiations between political parties.

Against my hypothesis, I consider three other possible causes for stable democracy: 1) elite patrimonialism, 2) a common national political discourse, and 3) the role of individual statesmen. Gamarra (1996) suggests that these elite agreements rest on a patrimonial clientelistic elite, rather than on democratic political institutions. Because the 1952 Revolution fundamentally altered Bolivia's political landscape, democratic stability may be facilitated by broad social consensus around a national revolutionary political discourse. Finally, democratic stability may be a function of individual statesmen such as Siles Zuazo, Bánzer, Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora, or Sánchez de Lozada.

I employ an embedded case study approach, placing the Bolivian case within the immediate context of two very similar countries (Ecuador and Peru) using a "most similar with different outcomes" (MSDO) research design. This approach assumes that differences in outcomes between cases are explained by their differences, rather than by their similarities. Although comparative, this study is essentially a case study of Bolivia's democratic system since 1982 and based on upcoming field research in that country. An embedded comparative study allows me to focus on political institutions, the only significant difference between the three cases.

Though the Central Andean republics were among the first countries in the third wave of democracy, their outcomes were dramatically different. Yet all three cases are remarkably similar. They are classified as developing nations. They share similar social and political cultures. All three lack any historical experience with democracy and share a history of authoritarian rule. International pressure for democracy is strongly felt in the region. All three shared similar transition processes, with pacted transitions as the norm. The three are involved in the US−led drug war. Finally, all three democratized in the midst of economic crises and attempts to implement neoliberal reforms. Comparing Bolivia to Ecuador and Peru also allows for control of an important variable: level of social unrest. Only Peru experienced a guerrilla insurgency during the democratization process.

My research design uses content analysis of the published historical record to determine if elite attitudes shifted over time in favor of moderated politics and coalition−building norms. I focus on statements made in newspaper archives, available at the Center for Documentation and Information (CEDOIN) in La Paz. I will also seek other sources, such as party archives, legislative voting and debate records, and public intellectual literature. I will analyze elite statements made about: 1) the quality of democracy, 2) individual political elites, 3) political institutions in general, 4) the electoral system, 5) the party system, 6) individual parties and social movements, and 7) the 1952 Revolution. The recording unit is the entire statement, regardless of its length, made by any one individual or group. I will focus on each election year (1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002) using the transition period (1978−82) as a baseline. I will analyze the entire electoral year, using month as subunits. I will establish inter−coder reliability by collaborating with Bolivian colleagues and comparing independently coded statements.

Further research for this project is impossible without extensive fieldwork. Archival historical data is available only in Bolivia. Archival data is the best source of historical data on elite attitudes in the absence of attitudinal survey data. I will have to spend several months sifting through the historical record before begining content analysis of the data. During previous research trips (in 1998 and 2001) I established research contacts at research institutions such as the Latin American Institute for Social Research (ILDIS), the Bolivian Center for Multidisciplinary Studies (CEBEM), the National Electoral Court (CNE), and USAID's program for Democratic Deepening and Citizen Participation (USAID−DDPC).

I plan to spend the first month re−establishing my research contacts and surveying sources for archival data. The remaining months will be spent primarily at CEDOIN and other archives building my database of historical record data for content analysis. During my fieldwork, I will work closely with Bolivian social scientists. Throughout my stay, I will also participate in academic exchanges (conferences, seminars, round tables) and continue to familiarize myself with recent national democratization literature.