Chapter I, Part 1 (preliminary outline)

Chapter I: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations
[1] Intro to the introduction … wrap up this entire chapter briefly (perhaps 3 paragraphs max)
1. Literature Review
[2] Introduce historical institutionalism
[3] Historical institutionalism most useful for studying Bolivian politics … because actors used pre-existing constitutional structure
[4] Historical institutionalism useful for Bolivian politics because of 1952 Revolution (historical legacies)
[5] Institutionalist perspective allows us to see how institutions interact w/ historical legacies … bring up that I’ll use concept of ‘imagined communities’
1.1. Democracy, Democratization, and Democratic Consolidation
[6] Introduction (maybe strike?)
1.1.1. Issues of Democratic Theory
[7] Introduction … emergence of empirical theories of democracy
[8] Joseph Schumpeter and elitist theory of democracy
[9] Stability-oriented theorists (David Easton, Maurice Duverger)
[10] Robert Dahl and pluralists
[11] Begin outline of polyarchy and its dimensions as balancing populism and representative democracy (esp. Dahl 1956)
[12] Competition
[13] Participation
[14] Civil and political liberties
[15] Wrap up pluralist model
[16] Intro to criticisms of elitist and pluralist models
[17] Carol Pateman and emphasis on participation
[18] Benjamin Barber and vision of ‘strong’ democracy
[19] McPherson and critique of liberal individualism and conflict politics
[20] Dryzek and critique of capitalism and democracy
[21] Pluralist model was oriented towards stability, but also liberal w/ emphasis on limited government and political participation (esp. later ‘neo-pluralist’ position)
[22] Emphasis on stability not necessarily conservative, since polyarchy also looks at ‘democratic deepening’ as important element, also democracy not as either/or, but a continuum
[23] Defense of polyarchy as operational utility (e.g. minimal standard)
[24] Brief defense of liberal democracy as universal value
[25] Pluralist model also tied closely to theories of democratization and transition models (e.g. Rustow)
[26] Pluralist models can also help explain democratic crisis (see Held p. 243)
1.1.2. Democratization and Transition Theories
[27] Introduction, brief definition of democracy as transition towards democracy (polyarchy) from non-democracy
[28] Basic model from Dahl and Rustow (see Sørensen)
[29] Structural preconditions arguments from Barrington Moore and S. M. Lipset
[30] Cultural preconditions arguments from Almond and Verba, and Wiarda
[31] Static view from Huntington (1968)
[32] Critiques of structuralist argument (O’Donnell)
[33] Critiques of political culture thesis from Terry L. Karl and Huntington
[34] Other critiques of previous scholarship (??)
[35] The ‘third wave’ of democracy (esp. Huntington)
[36] Concept of ‘democratic opening’ and different transition paths
[37] Pacted transitions (Di Palma) (and relationship to elitist democracy?)
1.1.3. Democratic Consolidation
[38] Introduce concept of democratic consolidation and its current usage and emphasis in literature
[39] Operational definition of ‘consolidation’ from Linz and Stepan
[40] Overview of use of ‘consolidation’ in Latin American literature
[41] Introduce idea of ‘consolidation’ as expansion of Dahl’s concept of democratic ‘deepening’ and use by others (e.g. Peeler)
[42] Difficulties w/ concept of democratic consolidation and its usage
[43] Simple endurance (Schedler) cannot guarantee democracy won’t later break down (consolidated regimes can/do break down)
[44] Whitehead’s use of concept of ‘viable’ democracy
[45] Emphasize that long term survivability of democracy is important
[46] Point out that I use ‘stability’ rather than ‘consolidation’ to describe Bolivia (and define, explicitly, what I mean by ‘stable’ democracy)
[47] Defend advantage of using stability rather than consolidated or viable or other alternatives
1.2. Democracy and Political Institutions
[48] Introduction … how institutions (formal/informal) relate to elite role in democracy (and relationship to citizens) … relate to the ‘kratos’ side of democratic equation … Linz & Stepan’s “no state, no democracy” (state as an arrangement of institutions)
[49] Institutionalist perspective consistent w/ procedural definitions of democracy … but also address issues of participation/legitimacy
[50] I will consider four different political institutions … electoral system … party system … executive legislative relations … informal coalition-building rules
[51] A description of the Bolivian model will be covered in Chapter 2 (below will follow only most basic theoretical considerations)
1.2.1. Electoral Systems
[52] Introduction … why focus on electoral systems and role in democracy
[53] Theories of representative democracy (perhaps Manin?)
[54] Why different kinds of electoral systems matter
[55] How electoral systems reflect different theories of democracy (majority, etc)
[56] How electoral systems interact w/ other institutions (esp. party systems)
1.2.2. Party Systems
[57] Introduction … why modern democracy is impossible w/o political parties
[58] Democracy needs stable, legitimate, competitive party systems
[59] Role of parties in training leadership
[60] Role of parties in channeling demands
[61] How parties and party systems evolve (esp. as reflection of pre-existing social cleavages)
1.2.3. Executive-Legislative Relations
[62] Introduction … why modern democracies distinguish between executives and legislative powers
[63] Brief outline of presidential democracy
[64] Brief outline of parliamentary democracy
[65] Fuller discussion carried out in Chapter 2
1.2.4. Coalition-Building Norms
[66] Introduction … coalition-building rules are (largely) informal processes
[67] Relationship between coalition-building probability to electoral and party systems
[68] Consociational, more ‘static’ coalitions
[69] Less ‘static’ coalition-building
[70] Importance of ‘types’ of coalitions (pragmatic, clientelistic, ideological, etc)
1.3. Democracy and Imagined Communities
[71] Introduction to ‘imagined communities’ (Benedict Anderson) and relationship w/ democratic theory (the ‘demos’ part of the equation)
[72] Use Dahl’s ‘demos question’ to add a corollary to Linz/Stepan: ‘no nation, no democracy’ … the first agreement for democracy to exist is that citizens agree they are a community (one ‘demos’)
[73] Relate to historical institutionalism and Bolivia’s historical legacies … briefly mention the 1952 Revolution (legacies affect institutions)
[74] But changes in institutional framework can also affect historical legacies, or the communal bonds (re-imagining the ‘demos’)
[75] A brief historical outline of Bolivia’s evolving nationalism over time follows in Chapter 3 … but hint that 1952 was a pivotal point in Bolivian history, and that many of the agreements from that generation seem to be breaking down into particularisms