Intro to Chapter 1

The following are (so far) the first five paragraphs of the first chapter of my dissertation (minus the footnotes).

1. Theoretical Framework

My study of Bolivia’s recent experience with democracy fits into the growing democratic transition and consolidation literature by scholars such as Juan J. Linz, Larry Diamond, Guillermo O’Donnell, Alfred Stepan, Jonathan Hartlyn, and numerous others. Such studies are marked by the use of procedural definitions of democracy, an interest in the broader historical context of specific cases, emphasis on factors of institutional design such as electoral systems and party systems, a focus on elite actors and their decisions, and a deep concern for determining when democratic transformations are secure and immune to reversal. Like most of them, I adopt a “new historical institutionalist” framework that defines institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). This new historical institutional approach considers both formal and informal institutions (the “procedural framework” within which political actors interact), and readily admits that political outcomes are also influenced and bounded by historical and cultural factors. While politics is in large measure a product of choices, earlier decisions have consequences, both expected and unexpected, on future strategies and choices.

New historical institutionalists accept rational choice’s assumption that actors behave strategically, but argue that individual interests, choices, and strategies are deeply affected by historical context (March and Olsen 1989). The new historical institutionalism also differs from a sociological institution that more broadly analyzes social conventions and customs (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). A disadvantage of sociological institutionalism is its inherent conservatism; while it is excellent at providing a rich description of a societies broader institutional context, it is much less cable of explaining social change. A new historical institutionalist perspective allows for studies of continuity, as well as studies of change, avoiding the extreme of a determinism that dismisses the important role of actors’ choices, or the opposite extreme.

Bolivian political actors did not design their institutions; democracy was inaugurated under a 1967 Constitution crafted during the military dictatorship of René Barrientos. Thus, during the early democratic period Bolivian political elites were by an institutional framework they did not construct. Though never implemented during Barrientos’ regime (1964-69), the constitution outlined the basic procedural rules of the post-transition democratic game. A new constitution was not adopted until 1994, though it did make significant changes to the country’s institutional framework. Nevertheless, Bolivia’s democratization was a dramatic break from previous historical experience and, since 1982, Bolivians created a unique institutional framework of “parliamentarized presidentialism” by accommodating themselves to formal, procedural norms outlined in the constitution.

Bolivian democracy was also constrained by its socio-historical parameters. The 1952 Revolution provides an important set of historical legacies still felt in Bolivian politics, not least of which was a political party system dominated (until recently) by parties with close ties to the national project pursued after 9 April 1952. Another set of constraints on Bolivia’s political elites included a set of consensus (seemingly also shared by the population) born from the difficult democratic transition process, as well as experience of the 1982-1985 Hernán Siles Zuazo government, including common acceptance of neoliberal economic policies. The combination of these various sources of political consensus, which reinforced Bolivia’s formal democratic institutions, has since broken down.

Adopting a new historical institutionalist perspective allows this study to analyze the interaction between formal institutional factors and historical contextual legacies. Bolivian political elites interacted not only within a context of specific institutional constraints and incentives, but also within the changing socio-historical constraints imposed by their broader social context. Although my goal was to study the effects of Bolivia’s unique institutional design, no study of Bolivian democracy can ignore important historical legacies such as the 1952 Revolution. Changes in both formal institutions structures (specifically, the electoral system) and the broader sociopolitical consensus had important consequences for Bolivia leading up to the recent political crisis. It was, after all, in that context that Bolivian political actors played out the democratic game.