Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Notes from the trains

The following were notes taken into my notebook on trains through Italy during my holiday break. These were things beyond the margin notes that peppered the draft I took w/ me. Apologies if they make little sense, each is tied to a specific, marked passage from that draft.

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Note 1A:
Use data on elite political consensus as indicator of underlying social consensus. Perhaps parties had economic & national consensus, which facilitated party agreements, because of social acceptance (i.e. a smaller ideological space). Perhaps a combination of new realities plus institutional changes (post '94) opened up the ideological space between parties, making elite bargaining more difficult. Traditional parties could still form alliances because they still shared common agreements, but found working w/ new, more radical parties more and more difficult.

Note 2A:
Cabinet data should look at both in individual personnel and distribution among parties. But I'm giving more weight to party composition changes. Free to change if I find sudden/increasing changes in cabinet personnel.

Note 3A:
Make sure to point out that democratization can be understood in two ways: 1) change to democratic government and 2) continued expansion of democracy. but should properly be understood as second, as always closer to approaching the democratic "ideal". This can help bridge literature on democratization and critiques of Latin American democracy.

Note 4A:
February 2003 (the police mutiny) and October 2003 ("guerra del gas") where both clear violations of democratic stability. I'll define both as "golpes" w/ only difference that October was successful, and February wasn't. Also, October seemed to have broader social support. Actors were:

  1. Feb '03: Vargas & police (who behind? NFR?)
  2. Oct '03: some opportunistic alliances of groups, esp. COB (Solares), Quispe, COR( de la Cruz), and MAS (Evo).

Note 5A:
Make organizational change to paper, separating formal (constitutional) rules and informal (non-constitutional) institutions. E.g. electoral rules are stipulated (formal), through the electoral system. But party system isn't "stipulated" in same way. Also need to diagram relationships.

Note 6A:
Make clear distinction between "true coalition" government and others. I mean a coalition where the member parties share joint administrative responsibilities (in executive) and share posts in some agreed-upon arrangement. As opposed to just infrequent or transitory support for individual/specific policy programs, etc.

Note 1B:
Political institutions as responsible for perhaps even postponing later conflict by "keeping a lid on" potential problems.

Note 2B:
Revolution ('52) need not be consolidated. At least post-52 elites shared a common "national project" or idea of "who" the Bolivian demos is/was supposed to be.

Note 3B:
Rewrite historical legacies section to deal also w/ idea of a national project. One of '52 Revolution's aims was to create a single "Bolivian" national identity across ethnic/class lines. Indians became "campesinos". This element of '52 seems to've been consolidated or generally accepted by elites until mid-90s. Most literature on '52 looks at political process. But I need to focus on the Revolution as a nation-building process. Elites tried, as in most major revolutions, to build a new "nation".

Note 4B:
Perhaps a diagram on post-MNR politics? By 1980s, Bolivia inherited a party system dominated by parties w/ historical ties (as successors) to MNR and '52 regime.

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